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People v. Dillon: Felony Murder in California
INTRODUCTION
The felony murder rule allows for a conviction of murder upon a
showing that a death occurred during the commission of certain
felonies.I The rule has come into increasing disfavor with both the
courts and the commentators. Many courts have limited the rule in
application and only enforce it grudgingly. 2 The critics point out
that there is not always a logical connection between the commis-
sion of a qualifying felony and a resulting death.3 Where there is no
link, the rule punishes a chance occurrence. 4
Recently in People v. Dillon,5 the California Supreme Court, in a
landmark decision, determined that under certain circumstances, a
life sentence imposed upon a first degree felony murder conviction
may be cruel and unusual.6 Dillon raises questions about the con-
tinued viability of the felony murder doctrine in California and cre-
ates uncertainty as to what penalties will be deemed cruel and
unusual.7 This Note will discuss the historical development and
contemporary form of the felony murder doctrine. It will also re-
late the doctrine to the concept of cruel and unusual punishment.
The facts and holding of Dillon will be analyzed in these contexts to
determine the potential impact of the case. This Note will then con-
clude with an examination of needed legislative action.
I. HISTORY OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE
The felony murder doctrine is derived, in one form or another,
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1983).
2. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW § 1, at 44 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
PERKINS].
3. Felony murder is based upon the idea that the commission of felonies creates a
high risk of homicide. "The problem derives from regarding the commission of the
felony as conclusive on the question whether the defendant acted recklessly toward the
victim." Fletcher, Reflections on Felony Murder, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 413, 415 (1980-
1981) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher, Reflections].
4. Where, for example, a defendant had taken all possible precautions to avoid
harm to others and an unforeseeable accidental homicide occurred.
5. 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
6. Id. at 450, 668 P.2d at 719, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
7. The California Supreme Court somewhat narrowed this question in a case de-
cided several months after Dillon. In this decision, they held that an intent to kill must
be established before a defendant may be penalized under California's felony murder
special circumstances provision. This holding precludes both the death penalty and life
imprisonment without possibility of parole, absent such a finding. Carlos v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983), see infra notes 129-33
and accompanying text.
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from English common law.8 The exact origins are unclear.9 It was
first enunciated by Lord Coke in 1797.10 Lord Coke wrote, "If the
act be unlawful it is murder."'11 This absolute conception was suc-
cessively limited in England 12 until abolished by statute in 1957.13
At the time of its origin, all felonies were subject to capital punish-
ment, 14 while attempted felonies were only misdemeanors. 15 Thus,
the rule merely placed upon the perpetrator of an attempted felony
the same liability he faced if the crime had been successful. For
completed felonies, where the punishment was death, he faced no
additional jeopardy because of the rule. However, since today felo-
nies are generally not capital offenses, that is no longer the case.
Therefore, the original purpose of the rule appears no longer to
exist. 16
II. CONTEMPORARY TREATMENT OF FELONY MURDER
A majority of American jurisdictions observe some form of the
felony murder doctrine.17 Widespread criticism has, however, re-
sulted in substantial limitation of the rule in many states. Three
states have abolished it altogether, Hawaii and Kentucky by stat-
ute18 and Michigan by judicial abrogation. 19 A number of other
states have retained the rule, but considerably lessened its impact by
reducing the resulting degree of homicide.20 Under these schemes
8. Comment, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Use of Statutory Criminal Pre-
sumptions and the Felony Murder Rule, 46 Miss. L.J. 1021 (1975).
9. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 689, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1980).
10. Id. at 692-93, 299 N.W.2d at 309.
11. Lord Coke wrote, ."If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A meaning to
steale a Deere in the Park of B, shooteth at a Deere, and by the glance of the arrow
killeth a boy, that is hidden in a bush: this is murder, for that the act was unlawfull
... " E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
56 (1797 & photo. reprint 1979).
12. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 38-39.
13. Fletcher, Reflections, supra note 3, at 415.
14. Under English common law a felony was defined in terms of which crimes were
punished by forfeiture. The felon lost "life and member and all he had." The common
law felonies were felonious homicide, mayhem, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny,
prison breach, and rescue of a felon. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 11.
15. Under English common law a misdemeanor was defined as a crime that was
not a felony or treason. Therefore, a failed felony, by itself, would not subject the de-
fendant to the death penalty. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 11.
16. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 44.
17. Adlerstein, Felony Murder in the New Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 249,
250 (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as Adlerstein, Criminal Codes]; Comment, Michigan
Supreme Court Abrogates Common Law Felony Murder Rule, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv.
1306, 1311 (1981); Note, The Felony Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23
CATH. LAW. 133, 134 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Felony Murder].
18. Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 137.
19. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
20. Louisiana, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania have reduced felony
murder to second degree murder, Maine and Wisconsin to third degree murder, and
2
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the defendant may only be liable for second degree murder,2' third
degree murder,22 or manslaughter. 23 Other jurisdictions limit the
circumstances under which the rule may be applied. Although
there are many variations, three general types predominate. 24
The first requires that the underlying felony be dangerous to
human life.25 This is commonly accomplished by listing covered
felonies in the statute and limiting these to dangerous offenses.26 A
second limitation requires that the underlying felony be indepen-
dent of the felony murder.27 This is to prevent an act which is actu-
ally a part of the homicide from being used as a basis for a felony
murder prosecution. It has been noted that absent this qualifica-
tion, every homicide could be made a felony murder on the basis of
the included manslaughter. 28 The third type of limitation com-
monly placed on the felony murder rule reduces the number of situ-
ations in which a defendant is held liable for killings by third
parties.29 For example, under some versions of the felony murder
rule, a defendant has been held liable for murder where a co-felon
was killed by a police officer. These types of restrictions have all
been adopted by the California Supreme Court and will be dis-
cussed further below.
III. FELONY MURDER IN CALIFORNIA
California's first degree felony murder statute reads, in part: "All
murder. . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem,. . . is mur-
Alaska and Ohio to manslaughter. See also Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 141-
42.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 137.
25. For example, larceny would not be likely to cause danger to human life and
would therefore not be a felony which would trigger the felony murder rule. See gener-
ally PERKINS, supra note 2, at 41; W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 547 (1972).
26. Additionally, some jurisdictions treat deaths occurring during felonies not in
the first degree felony murder statute, as second degree felony murders. However, the
courts often rule that this only applies to dangerous to human life felonies. Adlerstein,
Criminal Codes, supra note 17, at 252. California is an example of a state which follows
this pattern. See infra notes 30, 40-47 and accompanying text.
27. This is commonly called the merger doctrine. Note, Felony Murder, supra note
17, at 144; the California Supreme Court declined to adopt this term, but acknowledged
that their objective was substantially the same. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 540,
450 P.2d 580, 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198 (169). See infra notes 48-51 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the California rule).
28. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 43.
29. A defendant may find himself subject to a felony murder charge when a co-
felon either kills or is killed or even when a third party is killed by another third party.
Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 152-53.
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der of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder are of the
second degree."' 30 Thus, "even without an intent to kill or injure, or
an act done in wanton and willful disregard of the obvious likeli-
hood of causing such harm, homicide is murder if it falls within the
scope of the felony murder rule."'31 California also subscribes to a
second degree felony murder rule. When a homicide occurs during
the commission of a felony which is inherently dangerous to human
life,32 and is not covered by the statute, it may be deemed to be
second degree murder.33 It has been held that while the first degree
felony murder rule is a statutory creation, the second degree rule is
a "judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal
Code."' 34 In order to appreciate the unique nature of the Dillon de-
cision, it is helpful to consider here the California Supreme Court's
pre-Dillon position on the felony murder rule.
The court has unequivocally joined other courts in criticizing the
rule.3 5 It has stated that the rule "anachronistically resurrects from
a bygone age a 'barbaric' concept that has been discarded in the
place of its origin."' 36 The court has also observed "that in almost
all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes
the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. '37
The California Supreme Court has also acted upon an express senti-
ment that the doctrine is "a highly artificial concept that deserves
no extension beyond its required application. ' 38 It has been noted,
for example, that this unfavorable attitude has swayed the court's
thinking in determining just which felonies are inherently danger-
ous to human life.39 The California court adopted a very narrow
version of the rule, holding that a felony will be determined danger-
ous by looking at it "in the abstract" rather than at the "particular
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Vest 1983).
3 1. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 37 (commenting on felony murder in general).
32. The California Supreme Court has stated that "only such felonies as are in
themselves 'inherently dangerous to human life' can support the application of the fel-
ony murder rule." The court directed that the assessment of the "peril to human life
inherent to any given felony" be accomplished by looking "to the elements of the felony
in the abstract, not the particular 'facts' of the case." People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574,
582, 414 P.2d 353, 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1966).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1983).
34. People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 472 n.19, 668 P.2d 697, 715 n.19, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 390, 408 n.19 (1983).
35. The California Supreme Court has continued this criticism in the post-Dillon
case Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
36. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 583 n.6, 414 P.2d at 360 n.6, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232 n.6.
37. People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442, 446 (1965).
38. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 232. (footnote
omitted).
39. Annot., 50 A.L.R. 3d 397, 409 (1973), See infra notes 41-47 and accompany-
ing text (examples of this type of case).
1985]
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facts of the case."''4 As an illustration, possession of a concealed
firearm by an ex-felon 4' and a felony false imprisonment were
deemed not inherently dangerous. 42 In People v. Henderson,43 the
court decided that false imprisonment was not "inherently danger-
ous to human life," within the meaning of the second degree felony
murder doctrine. 44 In this case, the two defendants had held a third
man at gun point. During a struggle, the gun discharged killing a
woman standing nearby.45 In determining that false imprisonment
should not be used as the underlying felony for a felony murder
instruction, the court looked to the statute.46 Because the legisla-
ture, in defining the crime of false imprisonment, included conduct
both violent and nonviolent, the crime "viewed as a whole in the
abstract is not inherently dangerous to human life." 47
The court also limited the California felony murder rule to in-
dependent felonies in People v. Ireland,48 when it held that felony
murder cannot be "based upon a felony which is an integral part of
the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution
shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense
charged." 49 The court refused to allow the prosecution to "boot-
strap" into murder the lesser crime of assault committed when a
husband shot his wife under mitigating circumstances.50 The court
also made this rule applicable to a technical burglary i.e. entering a
dwelling, where the sole object of the entry was to commit the fel-
ony of assault.51
The court has additionally limited defendant liability for killings
done by a third party. In People v. Washington52 they addressed
liability for killings committed by a victim while resisting a crime.
The defendant's accomplice had been shot and killed by the victim
of the robbery. The court refused to allow this act to be tied to the
40. See supra note 32.
41. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971).
42. People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 94, 560 P.2d at 1184, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
45. Id. at 91-92, 560 P.2d at 1182-83, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4.
46. Id. at 96, 560 P.2d at 1186, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 7; See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 237 (West Supp. 1983) which provides in part: "If. . . false imprisonment be ef-
fected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, it shall be punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison."
47. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d at 94, 560 P.2d at 1184, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
48. 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969). A husband, distraught
over his wife's affairs with other men, shot and killed her. The court refused to allow a
felony murder conviction when the underlying felony relied upon was assault with a
deadly weapon.
49. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
50. Id.
51. People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969).
52. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
[Vol. 21
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defendant via the felony murder rule.53 It held that such a killing
could not be considered to have been "committed by him in the
perpetration" of a felony within the meaning of the statute.54 This
limitation, however, was not made applicable to instances where a
defendant initiated a gun battle, because there is a clear connection
between this act and a resulting death. 55
The majority of the California Supreme Court has thus expressed
a consistent dislike of the felony murder rule.5 6 Their antipathy
may explain their willingness to break new ground in the context of
the doctrine. The facts of Dillon and the court's holding should be
read with this in mind.
IV. THE FACTS OF DILLON
The defendant in Dillon was a seventeen year old rural California
high school student. The deceased, Dennis Johnson, grew illegal
marijuana on a farm in the area.57 When the defendant learned of
Johnson's farm he made two abortive attempts to rob him.5 8 The
first raid, carried out with several friends, resulted in Johnson warn-
ing the group off at gun point. The defendant and his brother aban-
doned a second attempt when they heard a shotgun blast.59 The
third and fatal attempt was highly organized. A total of eight boys
participated; they equipped themselves with maps, harvesting tools,
rope, guns, and other weapons and equipment. However, they be-
came separated, several boys were chased by dogs, and one boy ac-
cidentally fired his shotgun.60 During this confusion Johnson, who
was carrying a shotgun approached Dillon. There is no evidence
that the defendant was threatened. He testified, however, that he
53. Id. at 781 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr at 445.
54. Id.
55. The court observed that when a defendant acts with "complete disregard for
human life "it is unnecessary to imply malice by invoking the felony murder doctrine."
Id. at 782, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (footnotes omitted). Thus, a defendant
who initiates a gun battle during a robbery will be criminally liable for any deaths even
without the felony murder rule.
The court recently applied this reasoning to uphold a first degree murder conviction.
The defendant's accomplice had been shot by the police following a high speed chase.
The court found that the defendant's participation and use of a gun, during the chase,
was malicious conduct. It was held to be the proximate cause of the accomplice's death.
People v. Caldwell, 36 Cal. 3d 210, 681 P.2d 274, 203 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1984).
56. This dislike has again been expressed by the court, in the post-Dillon case Car-
los v. Superior Court 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal Rptr. 79 (1983). See infra
notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
57. The court in Dillon refused to accept an argument that because marijuana was
illegal, it was not subject to theft. They found that "prohibiting possession of an item
... does not license criminals to take it. . . ." People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 456-
57 n.5, 668 P.2d 697, 704 n.5, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 397 n.5 (1983).
58. Id. at 451-52, 668 P.2d at 700-01, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
59. Id.
60. Id.
1985]
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 3, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss3/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
believed that his friends had been shot and he feared for his own
life. He shot Johnson nine times, killing him. 61
V. THE COURT'S HOLDING
The court upheld the constitutionality of the felony murder stat-
ute, rejecting the notion that the rule creates a presumptionbf mal-
ice, thus violating due process requirements.62 However, they went
on to find that "in some first degree felony murder cases this Pro-
crustean penalty may violate the prohibition of the California Con-
stitution against cruel or unusual punishments. '63 Dillon represents
a departure for the California Supreme Court. The court had previ-
ously confined its efforts to placing mechanical limitations on the
rule's operation. However, in Dillon the court addresses one of the
fundamental problems inherent in the rule itself; the rule can lead to
a punishment which "not only fails to fit the crime, 'it does not fit
the criminal.' "64
The Supreme Court cited a 1976 case, as controlling. 65 In In re
Lynch,66 it was declared that "a punishment may violate. . . the
California Constitution if. . . it is so disproportionate to the crime
for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity. ' 67 The Dillon court based
its analysis for determining proportionality on two "techniques"
which had been identified in Lynch. First, "the nature of the of-
fense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of
danger both present to society," must be examined.68 The court
found the following elements concerning this point of particular sig-
nificance: 1) the defendant was immature and did not fully compre-
hend what he was doing when he shot Johnson;69 2) both the judge
and jury felt that the punishment they were compelled to impose
61. Id.
62. The court held that "as a matter of law malice is not an element of felony
murder," and that therefore the statute does not violate due process by creating a pre-
sumption of malice. This conceptual approach avoids the transfer of the malice from
the underlying felony to the murder as done in some jurisdictions. It also makes the
rule somewhat more arbitrary and subject to a cruel and unusual attack. This is be-
cause, to some extent, the culpability for the underlying felony is also isolated from the
culpability for the murder. Id. at 475-76, 668 P.2d at 717-18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11.
63. Id. at 477, 668 P.2d at 719, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (citing CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 17).
64. Id. at 479, 668 P.2d at 721, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 477, 668 P.2d at 719, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
66. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
67. Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
68. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 479, 668 P.2d at 720, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 413. (citation
omitted)
69. A psychologist offered expert testimony that the defendant "was immature in a
number of ways: intellectually, he showed poor judgment and planning; socially he
functioned 'like a much younger child'; emotionally, he reacted 'again, like a much
[Vol. 21
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was overly harsh and counterproductive; 70 3) the defendant acted
in a panic, responding "to a suddenly developing situation that de-
fendant perceived as putting his life in immediate danger"; 71 and 4)
the defendant had not been in trouble with the law before this
incident.72
The second technique used by the court was a comparison of the
penalty imposed in relation to "those prescribed in the same juris-
diction for more serious crimes."'73 On this point, the Dillon court
observed that when two crimes are compared, and the lesser is pun-
ished more severely, the unfairness is very clear.74 It is, however,
also unfair when crimes of varying gravity receive the same punish-
ment. The court noted the following on this issue: 1) although
there were extensive mitigating circumstances in this case, the de-
fendant received the same punishment that he would have received
for a "cold blooded" premeditated murder;75 and 2) his accom-
plices, who were party to the conspiracy to commit the robbery,
received only "petty chastisements. '76
In analysing the Lynch techniques, the court provided additional
indicators for the trial court to use in assessing the culpability of a
defendant.77 They directed the lower courts to consider the "total-
ity of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the of-
fense. . . including such factors as its motive, the way it was
committed, the extent of the defendant's involvement, and the con-
sequences of his acts."' 78 In addition, a court should assess the indi-
vidual, considering "such factors as . . . age, prior criminality,
younger child' by denying the reality of stressful events and living rather in a world of
make-believe." Id. at 483, 668 P.2d at 723, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
70. Id. at 484-85, 668 P.2d at 724-25, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18.
71. Id. at 488, 668 P.2d at 727, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
72. Id.
73. The court also found the third Lynch technique, comparing the sentence with
penalties in other jurisdictions for the same offense, was not needed in every case. They
explained that not all techniques must be invoked in order to find a sentence dispropor-
tionate. They did not apply it in Dillon. Id. at 487 n.38, 668 P.2d at 726 n.38, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 419 n.38 (citation omitted).
74. Id.
75. Because of the defendant's minority, the death penalty was not a possibility.
Id. at 487, 668 P.2d at 726, 194 Cal Rptr. at 419.
76. The court noted that the other boys had both armed themselves and helped to
plan the robbery. They were therefore "coconspirators" or "at the very least. . . alders
and abettors and hence principals in the commission of. . . the killing." Four of the
other boys merely received probation, one was placed in a juvenile education and train-
ing project, and the sole adult received one year in the county jail and three years proba-
tion. The court stated that these sentences, representing "the proverbial slap on the
wrist," underscored "the excessiveness of defendant's punishment .... " Id. at 488,
668 P.2d at 727, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
77. Id. at 479, 668 P.2d at 720, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
78. Id. at 479, 668 P.2d at 720, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14.
1985]
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personal characteristics, and state of mind."'79
On this basis, the court ordered the conviction reduced to second
degree murder.80 Although the court identified a number of tests to
guide lower courts in applying Dillon, it remains unclear just how
those tests will apply to facts different from those in Dillon. The
form of Dillon's effect is more likely to draw from the concept of
cruel and unusual punishment than from prior developments of the
felony murder rule. This is because Dillon does not alter the
mechanical application of the rule by redefining it. Instead, it pre-
vents application of the rule when the outcome would be so unjust
as to be cruel and unusual.
VI. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In order to anticipate Dillon's ultimate impact, it is instructive to
consider the history and development of the ban on cruel and unu-
sual punishment. The phrase first appeared in 1688 in the English
Bill of Rights.81 Many commentators conclude that the objective
was to eliminate the then common punishments such as "branding,
burning, and disemboweling."'8 2 An alternate theory holds that the
intent was merely to prevent the courts from exceeding their legal
authority.8 3 The American founding fathers included a prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment in the eighth amendment of
the Constitution.84 There has been considerable debate as to the in-
tended meaning of the concept of cruel and unusual punishment. s5
However, the United States Supreme Court has generally identified
four factors to be considered in determining if a sentence violates
the eighth amendment. First, "whether the method of punishment
is inherently cruel or severe . . . ." Second, "whether the punish-
ment is excessive, disproportionate, or unnecessary. . . ." Third,
"whether the punishment is unacceptable to society ... "
Fourth, "whether the punishment is being inflicted arbitrarily
"86
79. Id. at 479, 668 P.2d at 721, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
80. The court held that the second degree murder conviction was necessary be-
cause Dillon had intentionally killed with no adequate legal provocation. They also
affirmed an attempted robbery conviction. Id. at 489, 668 P.2d at 727, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
420.
81. Annot. 33 A.L.R. 335, 349 (1970).
82. Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 846, 847 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Cruel and Unusual Punishment].
83. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 318 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
85. This debate is however beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of this
topic see generally Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 82.
86. Annot. 33 L. ED. 2D 932, 942 (1972).
[Vol. 21
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Despite these broad principles, the concrete application of the
concept of cruel and unusual has proven elusive. As Justice Burger
stated in Furman v. Georgia, "the ban on 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments' is one of the most difficult to translate into judicially man-
ageable terms."'8 7 The requirement of proportionality has been
particularly difficult to pin down. 88 The Lynch techniques dis-
cussed above have been used to determine proportionality.8 9 In Dil-
lon, the court noted that what constitutes disproportionate
punishment is "a question of degree. The choice of fitting and
proper penalties is not an exact science." 90 In essence, the determi-
nation of disproportionality is a process of weighing the seriousness
of the crime against the severity of the penalty imposed. Because an
extreme imbalance is what is required, the courts have little trouble
finding harsh sentences for less serious crimes cruel and unusual.
However, as the gravity of the crime increases, the margin for
legislative error in determining punishment for a crime decreases.
Therefore, the courts have been reluctant to second guess the
lawmakers in those situtations. The United States Supreme Court
noted this about felony sentences in Hutto v. Davis, 91 "the exces-
siveness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a
subjective determination, there being no clear way to make any con-
stitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or
longer term of years."' 92 In Hutto, two consecutive twenty year
sentences meted out for an intent to distribute and the distribution
of nine ounces of marijuana was held not cruel and unusual.93
Although the United States Supreme Court has treated the setting
of punishments up to life imprisonment 94 as largely a legislative pre-
rogative, they have created an exception for capital punishment.
This is because of the unique and irrevocable nature of the death
penalty. 95 This more restrictive attitude has had an effect upon the
87. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 376 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 82, at 850.
89. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 479, 668 P.2d at 720, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 413
90. Id. at 478, 668 P.2d at 720, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 413 (citing Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at
423, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226).
91. 454 U.S. 370, (1982).
92. Id. at 373.
93. Id.
94. For example, the Court has held that no eighth amendment issue was raised by
a life sentence imposed under the Texas recividist law, where the defendant committed
three nonviolent crimes for the amounts of $80.00, $28.36, and $120.75. Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See contra Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) where
the Supreme Court subsequently has held that a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole imposed under a South Dakota recidivist statute similar to that
examined by the court in Rummel was violative of the eighth amendment.
95. Although serious crimes generally raise little question as to the legislature's
power to set punishments, the United States Supreme Court has created an exception to
this for the death penalty. As Justice Stewart noted, "[t]he penalty of death differs from
1985]
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felony murder doctrine. In Enmund v. Florida,96 for example, the
Court held that a defendant may not be condemned to death, under
the felony murder rule, where the defendant "does not himself kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force
will be employed."'97
California appears to be one of the first jurisdictions to hold that
a noncapital murder sentence can be subject to a finding that the
punishment was cruel and unusual.98
VII. PROPORTIONALITY IN CALIFORNIA
California, like most states, has a constitutional provision prohib-
iting cruel and unusual punishments. 99 The Dillon decision is based
on these state provisions. 100 Although the court in Dillon refers to
the reasoning found in Enmund v. Florida, 10 ' it is clear that En-
mund's reasoning was based solely upon the unique nature of capi-
tal punishment.102 In addition to the extensive eighth amendment
regulation of the death penalty, the California court has further lim-
ited capital punishment in felony murder cases.103 Because of this,
Dillon will impact mostly upon noncapital cases. It is therefore in-
structive to consider the crimes and punishments in the cases cited
in Dillon as illustrative of the Lynch techniques, because all five
were noncapital cases in which the sentences were deemed
disproportionate.
The common thread linking these cases is that they involve rela-
tively small crimes and most of the defendants faced long prison
terms. For example, in In re Lynch, 1°4 the defendant served five
years for exposing himself to a waitress in a drive-in restaurant.
The court has also considered the circumstances of the crime when
it was of a more serious nature. In In re Foss,105 the petitioner had
all other forms of criminal punishment .... It is unique in its total irrevocability...
its rejection of rehabilitation [and] its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in
our concept of humanity." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1971).
96. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
97. Id. at 797. In this case the defendant had been sentenced to death on evidence
that he had been waiting in a car while his companions murdered an elderly couple.
98. The Supreme Court recently applied a proportionality analysis to a life sen-
tence without possibility of parole imposed for the commission of a nonviolent felony in
Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). See generally Note, Solem v. Helm: The Courts'
Continued Struggle to Define Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 590
(1985).
99. Annot. 33 A.L.R. 335, at 349 (1970).
100. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at, 477, 668 P.2d at, 719, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
101. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
102. Id. at 798.
103. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
104. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
105. 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
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helped a police informant to secure heroin after the man told him
that he was in pain from withdrawal.106 The court felt that a sen-
tence of ten years With no possibility of parole was excessive. Simi-
larly, in In re Rodriguez,0 7 the defendant had served twenty-two
years for nonviolent child molestation. 0 8 He had an intelligence
quotient of 68 and was not likely to present further danger to the
community. The court found this cruel and unusual. 10 9 In In re
Grant,110 the defendant had sold marijuana, with two previous con-
victions, and was sentenced to ten years without parole. The final
case noted, In re Reed,"' involved a challenge to the California
requirement that sex crime offenders register with the police. The
defendant had been sentenced to probation for having made a ho-
mosexual solicitation to an undercover vice officer.
Prior to the decision in Dillon, the California Supreme Court had
thus applied California's own constitutional cruel and unusual pun-
ishment provision to cases of this nature. There are no fine distinc-
tions involved here. The punishments are clearly disproportionate
to the crimes. It is also obvious that they bear scant relation to an
intentional murder. Unlike the above cases, Dillon involved a seri-
ous crime. As both Justice Richardson and Justice Broussard
pointed out, Dillon armed himself for a robbery, expecting confron-
tation and then killed a man. 1 2 No other reported American case
was found where a first degree felony murder life sentence had been
deemed to be cruel and unusual. On the contrary, a number of state
supreme courts have specifically found such sentences not cruel and
unusual. 1 3 Thus, Dillon, not only changed the felony murder rule,
but also appears to carry the concept of cruel and unusual punish-
ment into new territory.
The Dillon court acknowledged that "[t]he legislature is. . . ac-
corded the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal statutes
and in specifying punishment for crime .. .. ,,14 Indeed, because
of the separation of powers,' ' 5 judicial discretion has been the hall-
106. Id. at 918, 519 P.2d at 1077, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
107. 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
108. Id. at 644, 537 P.2d at 387, 122 Cal Rptr. at 555.
109. Id. at 656, 537 P.2d at 397, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
110. 18 Cal. 3d 1, 553 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976).
111. 33 Cal. 3d 914, 663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rtpr. 658 (1983).
112. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 501, 504, 668 P.2d at 736, 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 429, 431.
113. State v. Wall, 304 N.C. 609, 286 S.E.2d 68 (1982); State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan.
487, 220 P.2d 279 (1976).
114. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 478, 668 P.2d at 719, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (quoting People
v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 640, 493 P.2d 880, 888, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 160 (1972)).
115. The powers of the branches of government are separate. When the courts ex-
ceed their constitutional power to review sentences, they are in effect legislating and
thus encroaching upon the area of another branch. "[T]he rule is that in the actual
administration of the government Congress or the Legislature should exercise the legis-
1985]
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mark of the enforcement of the ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ments. The United States Supreme Court recognized this when
they stated that "Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be
nor appear to be merely the subjective views of individual jus-
tices." 116 Consequently, cruel and unusual findings have typically
been found only in cases involving trivial offenses or capital punish-
ment. 117 Dillon falls into neither category and therefore raises a
question of judicial overreaching. The legislature has set life impris-
onment as the punishment for a Dillon type of felony murder. Dil-
lon's actual sentence would have carried an enhanced base term of
twenty years, with a possibility of release with parole in seven
years. 1 8 Such a denial of legislative discretion may well amount to
what Justice Richardson characterized as an "invasion. . .of the
powers of the Legislature to define crimes and prescribe punish-
ments ... ."19 Dillon, however, does not apply to all felony
murders. The court has only limited the felony murder doctrine's
application in situations where the defendant lacks culpability. An
examination of this requirement reveals a possible reason for the
court's action. It may be explained by the concept of mens rea.
VIII. MENS REA
Dillon applies the concept of cruel and unusual punishment to the
felony murder rule for the first time. Although the facts of the case
may make this particular application questionable, 120 there is a logi-
cal connection between the two. The link is found in mens rea. 121
A cruel and unusual analysis includes consideration of the defen-
dant's mental state 22 and this is precisely what the felony murder
rule seeks to avoid. The California rule dispenses with the need to
prove malice aforethought and premeditation in first degree felony
lative power, the President or the State executive, the Governor, the executive power,
and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial power. . . ." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 121 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
(1928)).
116. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 275 (1980)).
117. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
118. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 499-500, 668 P.2d at 735, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
119. Id. at 499, 668 P.2d at 734-35, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (Richardson, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
120. There would, for example, be less of an issue of judicial overreaching if the
death in Dillon had been accidental as opposed to willful.
121. A dictionary definition of mens rea is "[a] guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful
purpose; a criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979). It should
be noted that "mens rea differs from crime to crime." For example "[iun murder it is
malice aforethought; in burglary it is the intent to commit a felony; . . . in uttering a
forged instrument it is 'knowledge' that the instrument is false plus an intent to de-
fraud." PERKINS, supra note 2, at 743.
122. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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murder. "[T]he only criminal intent required is the specific intent
to commit the particular felony." 123 Other jurisdictions define their
statutes as including a conclusive presumption of mens rea, arising
upon a showing that the felony was committed. 124
Both forms of the rule free the prosecution from the burden of
proving mens rea. This has been attacked because it can create
strict criminal liability. 125 It has been observed that "[t]he felony
murder rule completely ignores the concept of determination of
guilt on the basis of individual misconduct" which is "the most ba-
sic principle of the criminal law. .... -126 The felony murder doc-
trine, by basing culpability for murder on liability for the
underlying felony, creates "additional punishment [which] is there-
fore gratuitous . . . in terms of what must be proved at trial
"127
It is possible, as Justice Bird pointed out in her concurring opin-
ion, that Dillon will develop into a requirement of mens rea for fel-
ony murder. 128 However, the court passed up an opportunity to
move in this direction in their first post-Dillon felony murder case.
In Carlos v. Superior Court,129 the court specifically found that the
evidence was not sufficient to prove that the defendant had an in-
tent to kill.13 0 However, no mention was made of a Dillon issue.13 '
Thus, it appears that a lack of intent alone will not trigger a finding
of cruel and unusual punishment. In Carlos, the defendant's ac-
complice engaged in a gun battle during which a bystander was
killed. The defendant, however, had fled the scene. 132 The Carlos
court held that it must be established that a defendant intended to
kill before he can be sentenced to death or life imprisonment with-
out possibility of parole for a felony murder. 133 Thus, while the
123. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 475, 668 P.2d at 718, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
124. Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 153.
125. Id. at 144.
126. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 708, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316-17 (1980).
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 Comment 6 (1980).
128. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 495-96, 668 P.2d at 733-34, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
129. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
130. Id. at 154, 672 P.2d at 877, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
131. The defendant did not challenge the felony murder charge, only the felony
murder special circumstances allegation. Therefore, the defendant had not raised a Dil-
lon issue in his appeal. However, it would seem logical for the court to have at least
commented on the issue, if they had intended that Dillon create a mens rea requirement
in a Carlos type situation. Id. at 138, 672 P.2d at 866, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
132. The defendant had been armed when he and his partner robbed a store. How-
ever, upon exiting the store, he fled while his partner engaged in a shoot out with an off-
duty police officer. The officer's daughter was killed, evidently by a bullet from her
father's gun. The defendant returned with a car and aided the partner's escape. Id. at
137, 672 P.2d at 865-66, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
133. The defendant had been charged with first degree murder under the felony
murder statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1983). Additionally, the prosecution
sought to subject him to enhanced punishment, death or life imprisonment without pos-
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court appears committed to a continued paring away of the felony
murder doctrine, Dillon may be only a limited means of reaching
their objective.
IX. EFFECT OF DILLON
The key question raised by Dillon is what the court's new thresh-
old of acceptable disproportionality will be. Carlos may indicate
that proportionality may not be an issue in the majority of felony
murder cases. Although the tests identified in the case provide
some direction, they create no bright line. Given the court's well
documented hostility to the felony murder rule, it is predictable that
they will be open to a liberal construction of their opinion. In Car-
los, they stated that their intention is to insure that the concept of
"strict criminal liability incorporated in the felony murder doctrine
be given the narrowest possible application consistent with [deter-
ring] those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or acciden-
tally."' 134 It would appear that although Dillon will give little
succor to the hardened criminal, it will prevent the harshest results
of the felony murder rule. The few appellate cases which have ap-
plied Dillon seem to be following this pattern. Only one case, Peo-
ple v. Beheler,135 has modified a sentence as cruel and unusual. The
defendant was blameless by almost every standard enumerated in
Dillon. In the remaining cases where a Dillon argument has been
raised, the defendant's actions or history indicated a pattern of
criminality.' 36 The courts found no difficulty denying relief.
sibility of parole, under CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1983). This section
designates under what "special circumstances" a defendant may be so punished. One of
the circumstances listed is felony murder. Thus, a defendant may face the underlying
murder charge and also be subject to harsher punishment, on the basis of the commis-
sion of the same felony. Id. at 153-54, 672 P.2d at 877, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
134. Id. at 146, 672 P.2d at 872, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
135. 153 Cal. App. 3d 242, 200 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1984). The defendant's first degree
murder conviction was reduced to voluntary manslaughter on the following facts: the
defendant 1) was drunk to the point of stupor during the planning and execution of the
crime, 2) may have been asleep when the triggerman, who received six years, did the
shooting, 3) immediately reported the crime and cooperated with the police, and 4) had
no criminal record.
136. Three of the defendants raising a Dillon argument patently had no legitimate
claim to relief from this source. They had varying criminal records and had behaved
like hardened criminals before, during and after the murders. People v. Darwiche, 152
Cal. App. 3d 630, 199 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1984); People v. Munoz, 157 Cal. App. 3d 999,
204 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984); People v. Harpool, 155 Cal. App. 3d 877, 202 Cal. Rptr. 467
(1984).
The defendant in People v. Laboa, 158 Cal. App. 3d 115, 204 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1984)
presented a closer question. He had been in another room when his accomplice acci-
dentally shot the victim. However, the court found dispositive a knowing participation
in an armed robbery coupled with a criminal record. They declined to modify the first
degree murder sentence.
A final case side-stepped the Dillon issue by focusing on the fact that the fourteen
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These cases illustrate that Dillon addresses what is probably the
major drawback of the rule. This is that a relatively blameless de-
fendant receives the same severe punishment as a hardened killer.
Indeed, Dillon illustrates the truth of the saying that "hard cases
make bad law," which has been identified as "[a] phrase used to
indicate judicial decisions which, to meet a case of hardship to a
party, are not entirely consistent with the true principle of the
law."' 137 In Dillon, neither the judge nor the jury wanted to sen-
tence the boy to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia has provided a much needed safety valve. Ironically, by
eliminating the rule's most unjust results, the court may have re-
duced legislative incentive to make needed changes. This would be
unfortunate because policy considerations indicate that such action
may still be needed.
X. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Criticism of the felony murder rule is not a new development. In
1881 Justice Holmes, commenting on the rule, declared that "it
would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot."
1 3
Although unpopular, the rule has nevertheless exhibited a staying
power. 139
In Dillon, the court once again calls for legislative reconsidera-
tion of the first degree felony murder rule.140 There are a number of
arguments which support this position. Even if the more extreme
applications of the rule have been eliminated, the basic criticisms
still apply. As Justice Bird observed, "the defendants are in reality
punished for the commission of the underlying felony," 141 if the
death was unintended, non negligent and fortuitous. In those cases
where the death was otherwise, the rule is superfluous. In England,
year old defendant had been committed to the California Youth Authority. Because the
actual period of confinement is set by the Youth Offender Board, the court held that
review should be had by petition for writ of habeas corpus, rather than by direct appeal.
In re Deatrick A., 155 Cal. App. 3d 340, 202 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1984).
137. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (5th ed. 1979).
138. Justice Holmes posed a hypothetical situation where a man, planning to shoot
chickens in order to steal them, accidentally kills the owner, whose presence was un-
known to him. He stated about this, "[i]f the object of the [felony murder] rule is to
prevent such accidents, it should make accidental killing with firearms murder, not
accidental killing in the effort to steal; while if its object is to prevent stealing, it would
do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
58 (1881).
139. Many states revised their homicide laws to conform to United States Supreme
Court death penalty requirements. Thus, there has been a deliberate retention of the
felony murder rule in many jurisdictions. Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 135-
36.
140. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 472, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
141. Id. at 498, 668 P.2d at 734, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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the abolition of the rule had little effect on conviction rates.1 42 Ad-
ditionally, there is no basis to believe that the commission of a spec-
ified felony increases the chance of accidental homicides.1 43 Thus,
the evidence tends to show that the rule serves little practical
purpose.
If this is the case, the legislature would do well to follow the
course suggested by the court and abolish the rule. However, this
would be a politically unpopular action because it lowers criminal
sanctions. A more palatable expedient has been suggested by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code. They would replace the rule
with a nonbinding presumption of malice when a death occurs dur-
ing the commission of a felony. 144 Although this idea has not been
well received, 145 California, as a leading state in legal reform, would
be a logical place for it to take root.
Justice Bird also points out that the court's logical course is to do
their part by eliminating the second degree felony murder rule.
Having determined that it is of judicial rather than statutory origin,
this action is within their power. 146 This would not only be consis-
tent with their expressed sentiments, but might serve to prod legis-
lative action by isolating the first degree rule.
CONCLUSION
This Note has described the Dillon holding 47 and discussed its
potential impact on California's felony murder rule.148 An exami-
nation of the history 49 and contemporary treatment of the rule 50
has revealed a pattern of criticism and successive limitation.1 51 Dil-
lon, like prior limitations, will operate to remove some of the harsh-
ness from the felony murder rule.152 However, the Dillon court's
invocation of the concept of cruel and unusual punishment in the
context of the felony murder doctrine is a unique development.15 3
Although there may be reason to question such an application on
the facts of the case, the underlying rationale has merit. 154 The Dil-
lon rule should provide the means for separating the relatively
142. Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 159.
143. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 Comment 6 (1980).
144. Id.
145. Note, Felony Murder, supra note 17, at 143.
146. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 494, 668 P.2d at 731, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
147. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 17-55 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
17
Miller: People v. Dillon: Felony Murder in California
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
PEOPLE V DILLON
blameless defendant from those deserving harsh sentences. 155
The felony murder doctrine is intended to deter offenders from
killing negligently or accidentally during the commission of felo-
nies. 156 However, the critics attack the logic of a rule which pur-
ports to deter unintended events by threat of punishment.1 57
Indeed, studies have raised doubts as to the rule's practical effect.158
The critics also argue that the rule runs counter to the American
philosopy of determining criminal liability, because it tends to re-
move the necessity of proving an intent to kill.159
A number of states have eliminated or sharply curtailed the
rule.1 60 The California Supreme Court has recommended a fresh
legislative appraisal of the felony murder rule.161 Given the margi-
nal utility of the rule and the many criticisms of it, such a reconsid-
eration is warranted.
Stephen L. Miller
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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